Sources of influence upon the South African response have been, first and foremost, the domestic environment and the vulnerability of the ANC government on the question of land restitution and redistribution, something that domestic political parties have sought to exploit. Another factor has been the regional states and the desire to maintain cohesion within SADC during this period of multiple crises facing the organisation. And, finally, the international community and — especially seen through the media - its expectations of South Africa have been a constant source of pressure.
An influential report produced by the Africa Institute of South Africa, the result of a government-instigated mission to Zimbabwe in early , characterised the crisis in the following terms.
Angolan Civil War - Wikipedia
In the first instance, there is a crisis of legitimacy as a result of the erosion of the post-colonial consensus built during the course of the liberation struggle. There is a crisis of expectations coming from the deteriorating economic situation and the failure of structural adjustment measures to halt the erosion of social and economic gains of the independence period.
And there is a crisis of confidence in the institutions of the state, inspired by the actions of the security forces and intimidation of the judiciary Since that time, various efforts to institutionalise international support for an orderly approach to redistribution have failed. Concurrently, the implementation of a structural adjustment programme in the early s, in conjunction with the difficulties experienced in competing in the emergent international trading environment, resulted in a contraction of the economy by 8 per cent in , unemployment increasing to over 50 per cent, double-digit inflation despite World Bank predictions that it would drop and a collapse in social services.
Finally, with the ending of the Lancaster House constitution in , various attempts have been made by Mugabe to alter aspects of it so as to further entrench Zanu rule through the creation of a one-party state or, after that failed, to severely circumscribe the role of other sectors or power bases. These were:. While these considerations exercised influence over South African decision making towards the crisis in Zimbabwe, the foreign policy approach adopted by Pretoria has experienced an evolution from denial to constructive engagement and, in the wake of near collapse of law and order in Zimbabwe in the run up to presidential elections, disillusionment.
The steady trickle of illegal immigrants across the Limpopo, the economic difficulties experienced in bi-lateral trade, the onset of strikes by public sector workers protesting against the fall in their standard of living, the drying up of Zimbabwean-sourced investment capital and the nascent political activism aimed against Zanu all could be seen in hindsight as warning shots of a coming crisis. This shift was fuelled, on the one hand, by the recognition that military intervention in the name of SADC by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia jeopardised the institutionalised nature and conduct of the regional organisation given its uncertain basis of action and, on the other hand, was a direct challenge to South African aspirations to regional leadership.
The hastily organised and poorly implemented joint South African-Botswanan operation in defence of constitutional rule in Lesotho the following month, which arguably had a weaker SADC mandate than the intervention in the Congo, was considered by many observers to be a direct response to events in the Congo With SADC effectively split between two poles — Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia versus South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique — Pretoria's ambitions for regional development and indeed its own role the continental leader were called into question.
At the same time, the European Union put its aid programme under review following a confrontation with Zimbabwe over the Congo issue.
Open discord within Zanu itself was increasingly voiced, especially after the economic costs of the land invasions and the Congo intervention began to take their toll By October , with the installation of technocrat Simba Makoni as finance minister in Mugabe government, a concerted effort was launched to halt the slide through currency devaluation, reduction of bank rate, limitations on government borrowing and reduction of state salaries.
However, cabinet ministers anxious to bring the farm invasions to an end found their actions continually blocked by Mugabe South Africa's trade and investment interests in Zimbabwe were still substantial and, despite the cost to the rand and its own international reputation, underscores the fact that Zimbabwe is South Africa's largest trading partner in Africa.
The imposition of economic sanctions would impose high costs on South African businesses operating in the country, in addition to incurring domestic political fallout with uncertain consequences The very real fear that a seriously destabilised Zimbabwe would ignite refugee flows and greater economic chaos across the region also stayed Pretoria's hand and exercised influence over fellow SADC states who themselves were not part of the triple intervention in the Congo.
With the involvement of Angola and Namibia in what amounted to a de facto alliance with Zimbabwe to support the Kabila regime in Kinshasa, the threat to SADC unity is very real indeed. It also undertook to serve as an intermediary between the Bretton Woods Institutions and Harare, giving voice to the concerns of the Zimbabwean state and business.
This is especially the case in the volatile area of land reform that Mbeki personally sought to resolve by seeking out foreign financial resources to pay for the purchase and legal transfer of white-owned farms. It sought to avoid any form of sanctions that would, it was felt, bring about a full economic collapse as well as directly damage South African commercial interests in the process. At the same time, the South African government entered into a number of discussions with Mugabe that, for the most part, sought to give public assurances of support to him and the concerns over the land issue while suggesting through private channels Pretoria's mounting concerns.
The Constitution Commission's liberalising reforms to the constitution, which had had substantive input from civil society, were rejected by the government in early February Contrary to expectations, He hoped through bringing pressure to bear upon Mugabe in private, while indicating support for his government publicly, the upcoming elections would be free and fair.
Peace and Military Policy in Africa
A summit meeting between Mugabe and the leaders of South Africa and Mozambique in April ended with Mbeki and Chissano proclaiming solidarity with the Zimbabwean leader, and privately voicing their concerns. This public position was echoed again by Mbeki at the Zimbabwean Trade Fair later that same year. The SADC foreign ministers meeting in late announced that the security sector would be included in the overall restructuring of the organisation and this was confirmed at the Heads of State summit in Windhoek in March In a clear demonstration that the South African government understood the role economic incentives have played in sustaining the complicity of the Zimbabwean military in the Congo intervention, they proposed that SADC undertake to develop a regional arms manufacturing capacity — one that would incorporate the Zimbabwean Defence Industries which have been key beneficiaries of the war in Congo — under the auspices of a restructured Organ This is especially the case given the involvement of Angola and Namibia in a de facto alliance with Zimbabwe to support the Kabila regime in Kinshasa.
Under the stewardship of Swaziland, SADC reconsidered the position of the chair of the Organ and the terms which allowed it to be used to authorise intervention Faced with concerted pressure from SADC, Mugabe finally agreed to relinquish his position in favour of an arrangement that gave the outgoing, current and future chairs a role in August At the same time, the crisis in Zimbabwe began to register within the South African political landscape.
Democratic Alliance leader, Tony Leon, became a persistent critic of the government's approach to Zimbabwe from the right while the Pan Africanist Congress felt the ANC's position marked a betrayal the dire circumstances facing not only Zimbabwe's landless black majority but within South Africa itself. Other voices within the country's foreign policy community urged action upon the government In Kwazulu-Natal, illegal land occupations mushroomed in areas such as Mangete, bringing white farmers, black tenants and squatters, as well as local advocacy groups, into direct confrontation.
The demolition of squatter camps and provisions for police and army protection of property under siege suggest that the ANC government was more committed to supporting the position of the white owners than that of landless blacks At the same time, Mugabe's call for black Africans in other SADC countries to launch their own occupations of white-owned farms at SADC summit in Windhoek in served to highlight the slow pace of resettlement programmes in South Africa and Namibia, raising the spectre of Zimbabwe-inspired domestic strife within these states.
South African officials, following in the wake of the UN's Millennium Summit in New York when Mbeki committed the government play a role as intermediary role between the international financial institutions and Zimbabwe at the behest of Kofi Annan, had secured agreement of IMF support for a financial package that would support some of the costs of a land redistribution programme envisaged at the UNDP conference. A meeting was held in Nigeria in September under the auspices of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group seemed to herald an eleventh hour resolution to the problem of garnering British financial support for land reform and its results were swiftly endorsed by five SADC presidents.
However, the land invasions continued unabated and, with Mugabe's decree in November ordering farmers to leave their land within three months, it was clear to all observers that the Abuja Agreement was dead. Growing pressure within ANC ranks to take action had been a feature of the public debate since on the middle of and was seen both in the public criticism and even resignation of some white ANC members of parliament and also in Mandela's thinly veiled statements on the subject.
The ANC's alliance partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party, have become increasingly vocal in their criticism of spiral of violence and attacks on Zimbabwean trade unions and the media And while the South African government has been fairly dismissive of reports that the rand's slippage has been the result of Zimbabwean instability, this and the continuing dearth of foreign direct investment were credited by the International Investor Forum-a leading group of financiers brought together at Mbeki's behest — to be behind the lacklustre response of investors towards South Africa Proponents of constructive engagement, within government fewer and fewer, centred within the President's office and in the person of Mbeki himself The rationale for pursuing constructive engagement had been both one of potential damage to South Africa's economy and a belief in the country's leverage over Zimbabwe.
While the former was fast being realised the latter never seemed to materialise. The period between and was characterised not only by the withdrawal of the Portuguese, but also by the arrival of Cuban forces and the South African invasion into Luanda. The MPLA retaliated with an influx of around 40, to 50, Cuban troops who succeeded in forcing out the internationally isolated South African troops, thus gaining control over the provincial capitals.
The Cuban troops remained stationed in Angola as a means of maintaining stability and warding off further South African attacks. In the meantime, the FNLA grew weaker in exile. UNITA, however, secured foreign support and established itself as an effective guerrilla army. Nine days later, the SADF again launched an attack, this time in Cuando-Cubango, incurring threats of military retaliation by the Angolan government.
June saw negotiations between Savimbi and dos Santos with the aim of reaching a ceasefire agreement. The agreement, however, broke down very soon after it was established. This further spurred negotiations for the establishment of a new constitution and the abandonment of a one-party state. UNITA representatives in Luanda were massacred in what was speculated to have been a government-endorsed uprising.
By UNITA had gained control of around two thirds of the country, including resource-rich diamond mines used to fund the war. It incurred sanctions by the UN after it broke a ceasefire agreement. On 20 November the Lusaka Accord was signed by both parties in an attempt to reach a compromise; UNITA would cease all fighting, and in return it was to be incorporated into the government. Although there is little evidence of a strong international will to ensure observance of human rights in Angola, the normative emphasis put on human rights and humanitarianism was now much more visible and clearly defined than before.
The intra-state parties were not keen to invite UN intervention — an attitude reinforced by the unwillingness of the Observer States to involve the UN. However, the mood would gradually change for two discernible and interconnected reasons. To begin with, a settlement of the Angola conflict, long considered a major contributing factor to regional instability, became a high priority of regional states. A settlement entirely dependent on the initiative of Observer States was unlikely to take sufficiently into account, let alone reconcile, the interests and viewpoints of all relevant regional actors.
Secondly, the actual on-the-ground arrangements for conflict settlement needed to reconcile simultaneously the interests of local, regional and global actors. The UN readily suggested itself as the most appropriate candidate, because it combined a number of characteristics: it had global membership, hence the capacity to accommodate the viewpoints of regional and global powers; it had a political mandate; it was able to draw on the expertise of specialised programs and agencies; and it had active field experience.
Once the UN was brought into the equation, the principle of state sovereignty gradually acquired yet a different complexion. On the one hand, the parties reduced their insistence on UN non-intervention, and on the other, the internal dimension of sovereignty gained normative priority. Promotion of sovereignty in its internal dimension neatly dovetailed with the promotion of human rights. In other words, the tension between two crucial norms, state sovereignty and human rights, was attenuated by stressing the internal dimension of the sovereignty principle.
The UN was expected to promote the creation of a political entity stable government which would enjoy an acceptable level of internal and external legitimacy within a defined territory. Such legitimacy would presumably depend, at least in part, on the observance of human rights.
- Table of contents.
- Conflict And Intervention In Africa.
- Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa?
- Peace and Military Policy in Africa - Institute for Policy Studies;
- Mad, Bad & Dangerous to Know: The Autobiography.
- Justice and Foreign Rule: On International Transitional Administration.
Without US support, no doubt, the Angola mission would not have survived. However, this support was generated through the persistent efforts of regional states and sympathetic middle powers, not to mention the indirect influence of a wide range of civil society organisations. In other words, the ideational dimension of the prevailing western hegemony imposed considerable constraints even upon the most powerful states in the system, and managed to modify their normative stance in this particular case.
This chapter examines specific ideological and aesthetic dimensions of the representation of children in American films produced during and directly after the Second World War in relation to the promotion and operations of the United Nations.
These films presented groups of children to harness humanitarian sentiment in support of the ideology and activities of the UN. Memoir has for some time played a significant role in the expansion and interpretation of the humanitarian industry. For both the relief and development industries memoir is admirably suited as an ambassador from the field to the larger public, oriented as it is to personal experience and testimony.
Conflict and Intervention in Africa
This chapter explores how humanitarian memoir generates an aura of authenticity much-needed by an industry reliant on public donations and on the perception of its status as a player outside the systems of state sovereignty and global capital. This chapter examines how Marshall Plan documentary films about reconstruction in Greece mobilised national culture and identity politics in their audio-visual rhetoric. You're not logged in.
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Rights and Permissions. Historical background Angola was colonised by Portugal in Towards active UN involvement In June—August the United States presented a settlement plan, which provided for free elections open to all Namibian political parties and the presence of a UN special representative. Addressing the international dimension US-mediated talks between Angola, Cuba and South Africa eventually led, on 22 December , to the signing of two agreements.
- Milestones: – - Office of the Historian.
- White Identity: Racial Consciousness in the 21st Century.
- Cuban intervention in Angola?
- Easy lessons in Einstein : a discussion of the more intelligible features of the theory of relativity.
- Estoril to Bicesse: no place for the UN in intra-state conflict.
- Account Options.
- Capitalism, Imperialism and the Wars in Africa. The Meaning of the Conflict in Congo.
Estoril to Bicesse: no place for the UN in intra-state conflict These initiatives did not involve active UN participation. The close relationship between the liberation movements in colonial Angola and Namibia, and the corresponding close collaboration between their respective colonial powers — Portugal and South Africa — is well documented in the literature: see R. The United States looks forward to normal relations with a freely elected government in Angola. Until then, we will not recognize or establish diplomatic relations with any Angolan government.
It had the basic conditions outlined by Boutros Boutros-Ghali for a successful mission: a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties; the continuing support of the Security Council, and a willingness of the Member States to contribute. In addition, several working groups were set up to deal with demobilisation, de-mining, police, humanitarian aid and other matters.